Marriage migration to mainland China has only recently attracted attention in public and academic discourse. Driven by a complex combination of structural and personal factors, many of these marriages remain unregistered, and understanding them requires a different approach than that used to study other international marriages in the region. To date, most discussions have addressed the phenomenon from a legal, demographic, or economic perspective. Considered as illegal migrants, many of the foreign women involved in these marriages are reduced to silence. Based on the specific case of Vietnamese women engaged in de facto marriages with Chinese men in China's southern borderlands, this article describes several factors affecting this social group: the condition of "nonexistence" that the couples experience in their daily lives; the local response to their presence in Chinese communities; and the ambivalent position of governmental bodies regarding their residence and life in China. This ground-level perspective demonstrates how the apparent tolerance of this complex phenomenon may, in the long term, actually create more disturbance in local communities than would be expected. This article reveals how significant gaps between official migration policies and actual practices of governance at the local level limit the social integration of marginalized individuals by sustaining the conditions for their long-term invisibility.
Introduction
Each year, tens of thousands of mixed couples (Chinese citizens married to foreign nationals) get married and live in China, and the numbers are increasing. International marriages may generally be divided into two categories. One group consists of those marriages that are highly visible and regarded as a symbol of globalization and cosmopolitanism, phenomena widely evident in contemporary Asia (Toyota 2008; Constable 2009; Jones 2012) . Shanghai, with its large expat and mixed communities is representative in this regard. In contrast, the other group of marriages remains largely invisible and occurs in China's borderlands, where encounters with the Other happen during daily cross-border activities and may lead to longterm relationships (Lang and Smart 2002) . Thus, a Western man married to a Chinese wife in Shanghai does not necessarily have much in common with a Chinese man married to a Vietnamese wife in a mountainous village of Guangxi. In theory, both couples should comply with Chinese laws, register their marriage, and enjoy similar rights. But in practice, this process may be hampered for the second couple by considerable administrative and personal obstacles that ultimately put them in a marginalized position due to the absence of either (or both) formal or social recognition of their relationship.
In her research on Mexican migrants settled illegally in the United States, the sociocultural anthropologist Susan B. Coutin (2003) elaborates on the concept of "nonexistence," which conveys the idea that groups of people are excluded from public life and recognition because of their legal status, even when they apparently live just like others in their community. This concept is also applicable to Vietnamese migrants in the southern Chinese borderlands, individuals whose position constantly oscillates between a tenuousand sometimes denied-social recognition and a perilous legal nonexistence. In this article, I
describe the case of Vietnamese women who, as wives or mistresses of Chinese men and as mothers of their mixed children, live in China in an inconspicuous way, whether they are integrated into or segregated from Chinese society. As I show, many of these women live in a condition of administrative or social "nonexistence"-that is, in the vulnerable position of being an unrecognized citizen-which distinguishes them from the rest of the population. My analysis is based on the ethnographic data I collected in four twin cities-Hekou (Yunnan 1 Since the topic of cross-border marriages is regarded as highly sensitive and secretive by local authorities due to its connection with illegal migration, I relied entirely on a "snowball" method among locals to approach mixed couples facing various challenges in their daily life in the borderlands. This research method entailed building a network of acquaintances through the personal connections of an initially limited number of informants, and leaving it up to them to introduce me as inconspicuously as Any research conducted in the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands must take into account the centuries-long connections between China and Vietnam that still resonate in the everyday lives of local people. The extensive existing literature on this turbulent relationship describes the complex negotiations that frame political and economic interactions in recent history; some of the literature emphasizes how these tensions are interpreted and absorbed by local actors, whether policy makers or average dwellers (Evans, Hutton, and Eng 2000) . Keeping in mind the historical background and the political context in which personal alliances occur today is essential. These include the thousand-year integration of Vietnam into the Chinese empire, the common ground of the two countries' languages and cultures, the 1979 border war, the current economic domination of Chinese trade, and the ongoing dispute over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, to name but a few. These sensitive aspects of the current relationship between China and Vietnam frame the empirical experiences of local people (Womack 2000; Turner 2010) . To this day, these neighboring countries are still affected by a prevalent feeling of caution and distrust; this is true both at the diplomatic level and at the level of the general population, despite the extent of economic cooperation that links both sides of the China-Vietnam frontier. It is against this particular backdrop that cross-border marriages have become more visible in the last two decades.
To explain the phenomenon of cross-border marriage that has received international attention for the last two decades, one must first look at local history. Borders have traditionally been porous lands of migration, where people and goods of all kinds have circulated under blurred rules that empires, followed by nation-states, have hardly enforced.
Movement was disturbed only by significant conflicts and by colonizing powers that imposed close scrutiny over the frontiers (Lafont 1989; van Schendel and Abraham 2005) . After the latest military conflict between China and Vietnam in 1979, the Sino-Vietnamese border reopened in 1991, allowing once again the flow of reuniting kin, traders, and audacious migrants. Following the recent economic development of this region into a nexus of international commercial exchange where border trade is actively promoted, border control has consequently been simplified through various formalities that allow local residents (i.e., native people) to come and go easily over the border and non-locals (i.e. established migrants) to cross the border without going through the tiresome usual procedure required for tourists crossing an international border. Therefore, thousands of people transit through the numerous mountain tracks, local checkpoints, and international border gates along the frontier each day, with or without proper documentation. In this context of intense human interactions, Vietnamese women also come and go, trading, guiding, translating, carrying, seeking fortune, and, in the case of some, selling themselves. Therefore, although the phenomenon of crossborder marriage is not in itself a new feature of local social life, it is now regarded as problematic by the Chinese and Vietnamese states, because it is regularly associated with shady border activities, such as human trade, illegal work, smuggling, prostitution, and various forms of deception on both sides.
Cross-Border Marriages in the Borderlands
Whether discussed in media reports, international observations, or official rhetorical discourse, cross-border marriages between mainland Chinese men and women from China's southeastern neighboring countries, including Vietnam, are typically analyzed and explained in terms of contemporary realities, often without considering their historical and cultural background. These reports emphasize the impact of structural factors, such as the demographic and economic gaps created by socioeconomic reforms to the local marriage markets in both countries and the changing conditions in which private encounters occur.
According to many interpretations, a lack of marriageable women in China and better life conditions there have attracted some Vietnamese women to migrate, a move rendered easier since the official reopening of the border between the two states in 1991. But such structural factors have proven insufficient to explain the extent and pattern of the contemporary crossborder marriage phenomenon.
As Coutin states, "The space of legal nonexistence occupied by unauthorized immigrants is... another dimension of a previously entered space of social nonexistence" (2003, 184) . Indeed, many men and women who seek social recognition by finding a mate and switching from being bachelors, single women, divorcées, ex-convicts, ex-prostitutes, isolated elderly, or any other sort of social outcast position to assuming the normative role of "married person" may actually enter other realms of marginality. Following Coutin's approach, I have argued elsewhere that the men and women involved in cross-border marriages belong, to some extent, to such excluded segments of the Chinese and Vietnamese populations (Grillot 2010; 2012a; 2012b) , positions that economic difficulties alone cannot explain. In the context of intense rural-urban migration, marriage squeeze (the current shortage of women in China due to the one-child policy and selective abortion), increasing gender inequalities, and social disparities that change the negotiation of marriages, yearnings for traditional conjugal ideals and a desire to enhance one's social position also explain the occurrence of these mixed marriages now deemed by many to be valid alternative options.
However, stereotyped representations of mixed couples in the borderlands, as well as the ambiguous status that they often hold, contribute to their marginalization in both their native and host communities, in a more or less subtle way.
To address the exclusion and marginalization of alliances between Chinese men and Vietnamese women in their social environment, and more specifically the absence of legal status-the "nonexistent" state-of the Vietnamese women, this article focuses on the situation of those living in urban border towns, drawing on couples' narratives as its primary source of information (Huynh Chau Nguyen 2009 The question of status and citizenship remains problematic for the last two categories.
These Vietnamese women may live in an isolated place in China where they enjoy no administrative support or rights. They may also be engaged in trade or service activities in the urban settings of the borderland that offer them opportunities to develop social networks.
They either stay on in China with temporary permits, which forces them to constantly go back and forth to Vietnam, or they manage to escape official inquiries and stay for a longer period of time, although technically illegally. But in all cases, as long as their relationship with their Chinese partner is not officially recognized, they remain in a vulnerable position, subject to many sorts of abuse.
Between Formal and Informal
There are various obstacles to formalizing a union between a Vietnamese woman and her Chinese companion. Most result from the tension between legal procedures and local marital practices, since the practices of bureaucratic culture vary from one country to another.
Several For the majority of the Chinese and Vietnamese populations, going through the bureaucratic procedures in their socialist administrative systems is often considered a waste of time and money. Thus, they tend to avoid formalities as much as possible unless they feel forced to comply with official requirements. In the specific case of marriage registration, local people's limited knowledge of the complicated procedures regarding international marriage causes them to neglect basic regulations and pursue their family project according to customary practices. Unlike those couples who get married through a broker agency, as in the case of urban areas where international marriage has become an industry (Yang and Lu 2010; Wang and Chang 2002) , populations in the borderlands receive minimal guidance. Due to the generally condescending and dubious public view on these marriages, and the issue of illegal migration and offspring that complicates the picture, Chinese civil affairs authorities do not make much effort to advocate for the recognition of these particular mixed couples.
Therefore, couples are often discouraged when they do seek relevant information from various local administrations. This is especially the case when the relevant offices are located in remote areas where the occurrence of marriage with foreigners is scarce and local civil officers are unprepared to tackle the related procedures. Unless couples decide to directly seek diplomatic representation (at the Vietnamese consulate in Kunming or Nanning, or the Chinese consulate in Hanoi) to proceed with the required paperwork, or to search for information on the Internet (for those familiar with such tools), local civil officers are (supposed to be) the only experts who can provide them with relevant information. But for those migrants who do not have a standard immigration or residence status, entering an official building already represents a difficulty, which they try to avoid. Hence, many couples rely on the experience of acquainted married mixed couples to take action-in the best case scenario-or choose to simply ignore the laws, remain in a common-law marriage, and give up any form of regularization… at their own risk.
Even for those who do possess the correct information on the procedure to register an international marriage, doing so still represents a complex, long, and costly path, given the character of the border population. As mentioned above, when Vietnamese women and Chinese men meet in urban settings in the borderlands, many of them are already migrants who have come a long way from a distant province to work, trade, and settle in these promising centers of development. For a couple that decides to get married legally, this means that they need to travel long distances in order to gather the documentation, stamps, and authorizations needed to apply for a marriage certificate: birth certificate, hukou, certificate of celibacy, and health check-up, among others.
Ly, a young Vietnamese woman from Móng Cái, got married to her Chinese husband in 2006, after months of hesitation. She describes the complex procedures they faced, in addition to their families' disapproval:
The procedure was long, but what I hated the most was the suspicion local officers expressed. My husband is much older than me, is from a minority group, and had never been married, so when the officer from the foreign affairs office in Hanoi interviewed us, he suspected that our love story was not genuine. This was very annoying, even humiliating! Why would we have traveled such a long way to get interviewed if our marriage was not real? But we needed their approval to proceed with marriage registration. We had to go several times because they were not convinced by our explanations at first.
In a way, Ly was lucky, because her husband's hometown was not far from the border and he could easily visit the local offices. Prospective spouses need to go to several administrative centers, mostly provincial cities, in order to obtain the requested documents or the precious stamps: police offices for the hukou and local registration of residency, the civil affairs bureau for non-married or divorced certificates, the foreign affairs office for an interview, consulates for validation of marriage certificate and visas, and so on. Sometimes they must show up, get interviewed, and check out several times before their application is approved.
For many, irregular situations regarding the residential status of the Vietnamese wife, recurrent suspicion concerning the consent of a union, or family disapproval are additional obstacles that delay registration and challenge the patience, intention, and budget of prospective spouses.
Regional variations also add to the confusion. Many couples emphasized the variation of the specific order in which actions should be taken, as well as the duration, possible complications, and considerable fees involved (including administrative fees, transportation costs, and bribes). All of this on top of the fact that being able to travel together to these different places already requires proper travel documents, such as a passport and visa, which many Vietnamese and Chinese living in border towns do not have, since they can rely on specific permits to work and live in the borderlands.
This unclear and costly process prevents many de facto couples from starting such a bureaucratic journey. Hence, many simply ignore regulations and remain unregistered, in limbo, for years or even decades, after which time some couples give up any attempt to legalize their relationship. In some cases, the controversial personal trajectories of the spouses, from the local community's perspective, impose and motivate them to keep a low profile in the community to avoid scrutiny.
When she was a teenager, Yên was taken out of school by her father, who had promised her to a man she did not love. She was in love with another man and opposed the arrangement, but eventually she was forced to accept the marriage. After a year, she divorced her husband because he had cheated on her (he claimed that she could not bear children). She was twenty-two years old and had had several miscarriages by then. Over the next nine years, she rejected all suitors, saying she hated men, and devoted herself to farming. However, after hearing rumors that Chinese men were better husbands-more protective, responsible, respectful, and helpful-she pursued the promises of a matchmaker. Only after arriving in China, in a village near Dongxing, did she realize she would be sold. She was pledged to Wang Shao, a retired teacher thirty years her senior. Shunned by local villagers because of his family background (as a member of the "black class," according to the Maoist categorization of the population) and a divorce that ruined his reputation, he maintained a very modest life. When he heard about Yên's misfortune, he negotiated with her captor to 
Is Legal Existence Negotiable?
When Vietnamese women illegally enter China without a passport, visa, or permit and live there for a while, returning to Vietnam becomes a complicated prospect. Many hesitate to return to their hometowns if they are unable to provide family and friends with gifts or remittances of some kind. Huyen is the Vietnamese widow of a Chinese fisherman in Wan Wei's village, a few kilometers away from Dongxing, which is also home to numerous Vietnamese wives (Nguyen 2014) . Despite the proximity of the border and the connections she may have to help her cross the border without a permit, 8 Huyen admits that she has never returned to her hometown to visit her family or resettle with her children in her country. Poor, but not to the extent of being unable to afford a bus ticket to get to one of the local smuggling border ports, Huyen's reluctance to leave reveals the real obstacle she faces: her inability to return home with dignity-that is, with presents for her family, positive news about her situation, or any signs of significant social or economic success. As with many other women I met in this region, for Huyen, marrying a Chinese man did not bring the upward mobility she expected, or even an improvement of her initial life conditions. Hence, returning to her hometown simply to do paperwork has subtle and contradictory social implications for a Vietnamese wife. Offering the impression of either success or failure conditions the ease with which one might approach one's community again. For some, the benefit of obtaining a certificate is not worth the risk of altering their social position and their family's reputation.
In Vietnamese communities, marrying a Chinese man may be perceived as the result of coercion or the ultimate way to leave sex work; in any case, the social stigma attached to such a union makes it a disgraceful act. But it can also mean marrying up and the promise of a better future, and hence be a promising act. In any case, registering a marriage (by acquiring documentation) exposes a woman and her family to commentary: in a Vietnamese village, the return of a woman and her negotiation with local officers rarely goes unnoticed. Therefore, the reluctance to request documents from the Vietnamese administration finds its roots in a protective instinct toward one's family, but it can also be attributed to the implications of the act. Indeed, when a young woman leaves her village without informing her family and acquaintances of her whereabouts for a long period of time, she stains her family's reputation.
One Vietnamese woman told me that, fearing gossip about her long absence (after she had been lured to China and sold), her family would rather pretend that she was dead than endure the shame of a bad reputation. When this woman eventually managed to return to Vietnam to visit her family, she was told to leave and go back to China, because her "existence" would alter the face her mother had managed thus far to preserve. Under such circumstances, had this woman wished to legalize her Chinese marriage by visiting her village's civil affair office, doing so would obviously have carried too much weight for her to simply show up publicly. Other similar stories indicate that the marriage registration procedure, especially for Vietnamese women who come from small communities where social networks are inescapable, represents a difficult project to undertake.
A Vietnamese woman whose marriage to a Chinese man was the consequence of having been lured, or of "choice by default" (for instance, being sold as a wife rather than as a prostitute) reveals another administrative issue. Being absent for a long time (i.e., over six months) without notifying the Vietnamese local administration generally means that one will soon lose one's civil rights (Peters 2002 his or her family, community, and civil authorities of an intention to migrate, whether for a short or long time, and especially when going abroad, he or she will be removed from her family's hộ khẩu. This registration system is also aimed at controlling people's mobility; the individual will lose his or her rights and risk the payment of a fine to recover these rights when reappearing and requesting any family-related document. Indeed, Article 32 of the Law on Residence 9 stipulates that citizens who migrate must declare their absence at their place of residence; otherwise, they shall face the "deletion of permanent residence registration"
(Article 22)-that is, they shall consequently be declared as dead, missing, or settled abroad.
In addition, even when an individual has registered at a migration destination as a temporary settler, Article 30 also stipulates that "for persons who have registered their temporary residence but do not live, work, labor, or study for six months or more in the localities where they have registered their temporary residence, the agencies which have granted the temporary residence books shall delete such persons' names from the temporary residence registers."
Although the Vietnamese women interviewed for this study often had no intention of staying in China, many of these technically illegal immigrants ended up losing their administrative status by becoming undocumented migrants in Vietnam without any guarantee that they could gain official recognition in China. Many informants explained how difficult it was to regain their rights once they managed to return to Vietnam after escaping an unhappy marriage or visiting family. The Law on Residence does not specify if and how one can recover one's registration in a household after one's name has been removed, but collected narratives and other scholarship suggest that it is always possible to "negotiate the state" (Hardy 2001) . Given the acknowledged degree of corruption in Vietnam's administration, these women also mentioned the lack of financial means as an obstacle to negotiating and making arrangements to recover their status and then apply for the necessary documents for a marriage certificate. Hence, the adjustments that well-rewarded local authorities may consider from case to case-the multifaceted regulations themselves-create the condition of existence or nonexistence of national citizens.
On the Chinese side of the border, undocumented immigrants cannot expect to be granted the right to live in China without a proper marriage registration or work contract. But
Vietnamese women who, for instance, find themselves in the delicate position of entering 
Between Authority and Empathy
In addition to each couple's willingness to comply with the laws, the question of marriage registration is linked to two things: the information available (to both couples and local officers), and the way legislation is enforced locally (with possible adjustments). Here, Chinese authorities face a dilemma, especially in the case of the borderlands, where international marriages are often the object of suspicion and very much connected with the ongoing activities of border trade and economic migration-that is to say, smuggling. In reality, Chinese authorities are caught between several issues regarding cross-border marriages. Authorities need to promote cross-border trade to develop the local and regional economy. In this regard, mixed couples play a significant role, as they serve traders' interest in creating a network abroad. At the same time, Chinese authorities try to control and regulate migration to discourage the long-term settlement of undocumented migrants. And, finally, they must also acknowledge cross-border marriages that respond to a regional demand for wives and may solve social problems. Still, they deter registration by rendering the bureaucratic process blurry and complicated, and they scrutinize reproduction, which falls under the marriage law 11 and the one-child policy. Therefore, there is a certain gap between what the central law requires and the way it is locally implemented, resulting in two emerging tendencies at the ground level: tolerance and repression.
Central Chinese authorities have a very delicate role to play-apart from repressionwhen dealing with these mixed relationships, particularly once the couples have children. have proven ineffective at combatting human smuggling of all kinds and have generally failed to provide good social conditions to the "returnees" (Bélanger 2010; Bélanger, Hong, and Duong 2007) . It goes without saying that many of these women find ways to return to China anyway, both for the sake of their children and because reintegration into their communities in Vietnam turns out to be too complex to initiate (Vijeyarasa 2010) .
At the same time, Chinese authorities may also tend to tolerate these mixed marriages and sometimes adopt a compassionate and compromising attitude toward them, providing a space between rules and practices-regardless of central regulations-that allow cross-border families to remain united under various conditions negotiated between the parties: payment of bribes, imposed low profile in the community, close surveillance, and so on. This is particularly the case when those in charge of implementing the central policies are members of the community and know perfectly well the concerns of the couples, who are sometimes relatives, schoolmates, friends, or acquaintances. They feel sympathetic toward families in despair, especially in rural settings. Hence, the dilemma of local administrators accommodates itself to a complex web of social networks, in which a representative of the law must choose between going against central regulations or going against the local network of social connections. It is an awkward position to negotiate, which has led to all sorts of compromises and an uneven status quo.
The Second Generation
The situation becomes even more complicated when a child is born. In theory, the status of a mixed child should be the same whether one of his parents is an American or a Vietnamese citizen, living in Shanghai or in Dongxing. But in practice, unfortunately, it is not. Since Chinese law does not recognize dual nationality, many foreigners married to Chinese citizens choose to give their child foreign citizenship and apply for a passport. In this case, they do not register their child on a Chinese hukou; hence, mixed couples are not subject to the one-child policy. Many cases have proven that, in fact, the interstices of rules allow for adjustment, as well as complications.
12 However, for a Vietnamese, the situation is different in practice. Being a Chinese citizen is (to them) comparatively more desirable than being a Vietnamese citizen, in terms of quality of health care and education. Besides, Vietnamese women tend to consider children of cross-border marriages to be Chinese, because the father is Chinese. Hence, most Sino-Vietnamese couples choose to give birth to their first child in China, and to get a birth certificate and register the child on a Chinese hukou. If they do not have a proper marriage certificate, this can only be done by exploiting connections or paying a fine for producing an unplanned, out-of-wedlock child (Greenhalgh 2003 ). When a second child is on the way, the couples often adopt another tactic: they may register the child on his Vietnamese mother's hukou. This prevents the parents from paying a fine for disobeying the one-child policy and the marriage law, but it also allows them to provide the child with a legal status, since Vietnam does recognize children born out of wedlock, protects the mothers, and does not limit the number of children each woman can bear. Articles 30 and 32 of the 1986 Marriage and Family Law clearly establish that recognition of a child born out of wedlock shall be attested and recorded in the Birth Register by the People's Committee of the commune, city ward, or town where the child resided 13 [and that] a child born out of wedlock who has been recognized by his father or mother or by the People's Court shall have the same rights and duties as a child born in lawful wedlock.
14 Each couple hence considers the best strategy according to its needs and the degree of agreement they can reach with each other regarding matters such as whether they want to stay in the borderlands, move to China, or give their child a Chinese education. But, in practice, complications may arise at various stages of their plan. Zhang is a middle-aged Chinese businessman in Hekou. He manages his brother's hotel, while his wife manages two brothels:
I came from Guangxi and arrived in Hekou in 1990. I met my wife in 1995, and we have been living together since. We only got married in 2004. My hukou was in Guangxi, and she could not go there to get married with me. So we waited until we could buy an apartment in Hekou and then transferred my hukou here. Then, it was possible to do the formalities. We had our son in 1999. But theoretically, we couldn't have a second child. We paid to buy a hukou for her in Guangxi [using personal connections]. She has never been there, but she is considered a Chinese woman from Guangxi now. This means that she must comply with the one-child policy, as I do. However, we do have a second child now. We had to pay 3,000 yuan to register the first one on my hukou. In 1999, my wife was still officially Vietnamese, and we were not married, so our first child was considered born out of wedlock. According to what we have been told, we would have to pay 78,000 yuan now to register the second. This time, the fine is for being born out of plan.
A Min, another Chinese man established in Hekou, also shared the tip he used to thread his way through the family planning policies (the "fake adoption tip" widely used among ordinary Chinese couples):
My wife and I have lived in Hekou for four years. She had just arrived in China four years ago when I moved here from Hunan. I am thirty years old and she is twenty-two. We have a six-month-old baby boy [born in March 2008] . We are not registered. Before, I was working on the casino boat, and I had been arrested and fined. For this reason I can't have a passport. I've registered my son on my younger brother's hukou. He has a rural hukou that allows him to have two children. He already has a daughter. My son is officially his second child. The decisions made at the stage of parenthood say a lot about gender imbalance, as well as about the prospects each couple imagines for the future. In many cases, when the child is a girl, couples tend to register her in Vietnam, while boys are more likely to be registered in China. Men tend to be more committed to securing their child's status when they have a son. A registration in China means that a father can have greater control over his child's school, health, and so on. If a child is registered in Vietnam, the responsibility for the child falls on his mother, while the father is excluded from any official role. The complex position into which mixed couples are put when facing their responsibilities as parents also reveals the level of trust and the importance of family pressure on the couple to secure a child's future, whether in China or in Vietnam.
Exclusion Comes from Categorization and Perception
Among the many real problems that mixed families face are marriage registration, access to Chinese citizenship, permanent residence rights, health care, children's nationality, and the right to an education (Luo and Long 2008) . But the problematic status of Vietnamese women, especially when labeled as feifa yimin 非法移民 (illegal migrants) or guaimai renkou 拐卖人口 (trafficked people), represents a threat to the Chinese nation-state, according to official discourse. Vietnamese wives also stand between different categories, according to which discourse one considers. By representing an abnormality in the realm of migration, conjugality, and social welfare, cross-border marriages threaten normality and are considered conceptually polluting. In popular narratives, Vietnamese women are not represented as victims of strict bureaucracy, unscrupulous men, or a poor economic environment. On the contrary, they are often seen more ambiguously, as hiding a secret agenda: they may steal Chinese money or the husbands of Chinese women, or allow Chinese men to satisfy their sexual needs in exchange for various advantages (i.e., being a concubine).
The integration of Vietnamese women into Chinese society through marriage will remain limited as long as local negative perceptions about them circulate, and as long as their relationships are not sanctioned by communities, families, and the law.
The main issue is that, so far, there has been little opportunity for many cross-border families to escape from such an ambivalent position, deriving as it does primarily from their communities' perceptions. Over the long term, this dynamic gives rise to social fringes.
These individuals become people who live in a state of legal nonexistence for an unlimited period of time under vulnerable conditions. These conditions lead them to adopt tactics to 
Seeking Existence in the Manipulation of the Law's Interstices
The position of these Sino-Vietnamese couples is also intertwined with the hukou policy and its changes. As mentioned above, there are families who manage to get around the legal requirements through family planning and registration of marriage and birth. But this very much depends on their financial means. One strategy, for those Chinese husbands with significant incomes, is to transfer their hukou from their birthplace to their new settlement in the borderlands. According to some informants, it was possible until a few years ago to essentially buy a hukou from the place where one intended to establish residency status.
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Apparently, the law has changed on this particular point and this is not possible anymore.
Nowadays, the practice for most people who wish to move their hukou from their native location to their new living place (in the context of permanent migration) is to buy property in the new locale. In both cases, the hukou's transfer eases the formalities regarding family status and rights and allows border people, for instance, to arrange marriage registration more easily, since they do not want to invest their capital in traveling all over China or Vietnam to get a stamp or an appointment with an official. However, the formalities remain the same and documents from both sides are required. If a Chinese man transfers his hukou to Dongxing, for instance, it eases things for him. But his Vietnamese wife still has to return to her hometown to get her own paperwork done. In any case, because of the cost involved and its consequences in terms of commitment, a marriage registration through property investment and the transfer of hukou is not a realistic option for many couples. The very category of marriage also means different things to some Chinese men. In the borderlands, many men who live with a Vietnamese partner are recent migrants who do not necessarily intend to spend their lifetime in a border town, and do not wish to move their hukou there. They may be temporary workers who own land and have extended families back in their village; they may be entrepreneurs who endeavor to establish a business with Vietnam; or, they may even be locals who seek a convenient relationship with a Vietnamese woman. But the issues of residency, caring for parents, and personal reputation are factors that they all need to take into consideration before making the decision to officialize a relationship that could easily stay casual and pragmatic, especially given the amount of For those who cannot meet the administrative requirements for marriage registration, remaining inconspicuous in Chinese communities and avoiding scrutiny by the authorities quickly result in a life of nonexistence. Officially uncontrolled for being an illegal migrant, or at best always on the move with temporary documentation, for working without a contract or protection, or for bearing children without being legally recognized as a mother, Vietnamese women experience the vulnerability of a relationship that is supposed to bring them security and well-being. Many women express their fear of being neglected, or of being denied any rights to their children if their husband suddenly decides to end their relationship or to return to his hometown (without a wife who does not have travel documents), or if his family refuses to accept the responsibility of having an illegal migrant in their household.
Generally, state governance of cross-border marriages creates the condition of nonexistence by allowing the phenomenon to spread and by ignoring these marriages and failing to provide realistic options to legitimize the situations of families that do not fall into conventional categories. Chinese authorities are caught between an implicit acknowledgment of the importance of a cross-border network that includes families and the need to monitor migration and discourage long-term illicit settlement (Li, Luo, and Long 2007) . The condition of nonexistence is the result of contradictory regulations and perspectives that may emerge from the inconsistent political agendas of different levels and offices in charge of controlling the borderlands population. As I have argued, the consequences of unassistedrather than uncontrolled-immigration for Vietnamese women engaged in a common-law marriage with Chinese men may be summarized as follows: They face the loss of their rights in Vietnam without gaining new rights in China. They rarely manage to register their marriage and obtain legal protection. They benefit from no assistance or integration program when they enter China illegally. Because they have few options to secure their position and their future, they may use illegal ways to integrate into Chinese society and thereby take another step into illegality. And, finally, they face the risk of various forms of exploitation, vulnerability, and insecurity in the context of their professional activities, family life, and interaction with local Chinese communities. In a way, these Vietnamese women and sometimes their children share the plight of another social category in Chinese society, unauthorized children (Skalla 2005) : an "outcast group of unplanned, black persons who, as legal non-persons, exist on the margins of society, lacking citizenship rights and state benefits" (Greenhalgh 2003, 196) . Nowadays, the ambiguous meaning of the term "cross-border marriage" reflects how the notion of legality, in its lived or empirical sense, has lost most of its significance in the context of the borderlands. Migrating and marrying across a border is not about conveying or adopting a Chinese or Vietnamese identity or way of life; it might simply be about yearning to be part of a couple, part of a normative structure or conventional pattern of family in societies that are strongly structured through marriage. Without entirely achieving the passage between singlehood and marriage with legal recognition, receiving no support from the concerned authorities, those in cross-border marriages remain marginalized, with no guarantee about their future as individuals or as part of a family, and hence "nonexistent," a barely sustainable position. And for migrating Vietnamese women, this can signify switching from being an existing social outcast in Vietnam to becoming a nonexistent subaltern individual in China.
Caroline Grillot is a Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in
Halle, Germany.
Notes

1
On this specific topic, see Elena Barabantseva's article in this special issue of CrossCurrents.
2
The Zhuang are the most important native ethnic group of Guangxi (with a population of eighteen million, according to the 2010 Chinese national census), and the secondlargest ethnic group in China. 3
In the cases I have encountered, the ethnic identity of these men and women did not impact the questions they were facing regarding their administrative status. 4
The latest update (May 2015) indicates that in Móng Cái such a pass is now valid for twelve months, contains now a total of twenty-eight pages costs 50,000 VNĐ, and has slightly changed its name to bianjing diqu churujing tongxing zheng 边境地区出 入境通行证 ("immigration permit for borderland district"). 5
According to two informants in Móng Cái and Lào Cai (private communications, January 2015), locals used to be able to easily get a national "travel pass" as well, at a lower cost (200,000 VNĐ). But until recently, local authorities tended to refuse to provide such a document to borderlanders, requiring them to apply for the short-term "borderlanders' pass," a longer procedure. However, this pass gives its holder priority (no need to queue) when crossing the border during sensitive times with strict control of the frontier. Such procedures may vary from one border town or border province to another. 6
In human trafficking cases, the Vietnamese women who arrive in China often face immediate difficulties that go beyond the mere issue of administrative recognition. Their consequent vulnerability results from the deception they have experienced, lack of resources, loss of bearings, and absence of help from or solidarity with the families, villagers, and community members with whom they are constrained to stay (Grillot 2010 Many of the couples I met in the borderlands previously lived in the countryside before choosing to settle in border towns, where they sought job opportunities and admitted enjoying relative impunity and flexibility regarding their marital situation. Hence, I suggest that border towns become the starting point but also the last spot on the migration trajectory of Vietnamese women, for this rather mobile social space allows a certain degree of invisibility. This is an estimation, since no available official quantitative data can support this statement so far. 16 I was not able to obtain consistent, reliable information on this policy and more precisely on its implementation in migration locations such as border towns.
